




















How can more theoretical innovation in economics be stimulated? Clues to the answer can be derived
from the work of theorists who have been recognised for their innovative contributions to economic
theory and from the philosophy of scientiﬁc progress. This paper takes the view that scientiﬁcp r o g r e s si s
propelled by the need to address unsolved problems. From problem theory it is derived that these unsolved
problems are generated by inconsistent assumptions and slows down theoretical progress for as long as
such problems remain unsolved. Gifted economic theorists intuitively recognise logical inconsistencies,
and employ various abductive reasoning strategies to ﬁnd assumptions that remove these inconsistencies.
Their research often produces new inconsistencies, and so triggers further theoretical innovation by
others. A rational reconstruction of the seminal work of Nobel Prize winners Kydland and Prescott
(1977) provides a running illustration, and shows that an understanding of the structure of economic
problems can allow more economists to deliver innovative theoretical work.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economic science will not advance without the eﬀorts of theoretical innovators and the many theorists who
elaborate and reﬁne these conceptual innovations and so integrate it into the mainstream body of knowledge.
It is the task of those who award prizes like the Nobel Prize in Economics to determine whose innovative work
initiated lasting major theoretical progress in economics (Lindbeck, 1999). This is a diﬃcult task already. It
is even more diﬃcult, if not impossible, to predict which theoretical innovations will be integrated into the
body of knowledge and to know how to stimulate the emergence of more such innovations (Stigler, 1983:538).
This paper derives suggestions, from the work of two Nobel Prize winners, on how to recognise areas
ripe for major theoretical innovation and how to generate such innovation. By following these suggestions,
progress in economic theory may proceed faster by directing innovative eﬀort to the most appropriate areas.
It may also assist individual economic theorists to deliver more innovative research in their ﬁeld.
The suggestions made in this paper are familiar to economists, and are centered on problems. Trained
economic theorists commonly acknowledge the centrality of problems in economic science by stating the
problem that their research is designed to address. Economic theories are oﬀered as reasoned solutions to
conceptual problems, and the importance of a theory is judged by its problem-solving abilities (Spearmur,
1991:41, Laudan, 1977:109). It is therefore possible to rationally reconstruct the development of economic
theory as a history of problems, indicating the centrality of problems in the progress of economics.
If problems are central to theoretical progress, one would expect gifted economic theorists to be those who
have an intuitive understanding of the general structure of economic problems. Viner (1937:109) conﬁrmed
this in his survey of trade theory in the "pre-scientiﬁc stage" of economic theory: "...such progress as
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1occurred was due almost solely to a small group of capable writers, able to analyse economic problems more
acutely and logically than their predecessors..."
Why an understanding of economic problems makes some theorists more eﬀective than others can be
explained by the fact that a perception of the structure of problems in a ﬁeld determines how a problem
is represented. Representation in turn determines the methods used in solving such problems. Gifted
theorists have diﬀerent problem representations in mind and are more likely to focus their eﬀorts using more
appropriate methods, and so develop theories that will be seen as advances and that stand a better chance
of being integrated with the existing body of knowledge.
Theoretical innovation in economics may therefore occur through the use of a problem-based approach.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a problem-based method for theoretical innovation by deriving
conclusions from the work of two Nobel Prize winners with the aid of problem theory. The ideas in the
paper could have been illustrated by means of the work of most award-winning economists who oﬀered
theoretical advances in economics. Due to the limitations of space, a focus was chosen in the form of Nobel
Prize winners Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott’s seminal research in monetary economics. By deriving
conclusions from the actual practice of gifted economic theorists, it is shown that the method developed in
this paper is implicit in the work of such theorists, and can be replicated by others to accelerate innovation
in economic theory.
A note to prevent misunderstanding: this paper does not oﬀer a new theory of scientiﬁc progress. While
the paper is rooted in existing theories of scientiﬁc progress, it has a more practical emphasis than the
work often found in the philosophy of science. However, it may be useful to brieﬂy place the ideas of
this paper in a philosophical context. Some of the most inﬂuential philosophers of science, speciﬁcally
Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan, recognised the role that problems play in the progress of science.
The premise of this paper is Popper’s (1972:258) view that progress in science occurs as scientists proceed
from solved problems to unsolved problems. Popper explained that science progresses through an iterative
process of conjectured solutions to unsolved problems (resulting in theories) and refutations (falsiﬁcation of
these theories). Unfortunately, Popper never gave much practical advice on how to derive the appropriate
conjectures that can be developed into innovative theories. Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan similarly provided
little hands-on guidance on how to create the new paradigms or research programmes that might lead to
progress in economic theory. This paper provides a method for increasing the rate of theoretical innovation
in economics.
2P r o b l e m s i n s c i e n c e
Science advances from problem to problem. Without problems there would be no way of knowing whether
science matters, whether it is approaching the ever-elusive truth. Stigler (1983:535) pointed out that without
unsolved problems, science would become sterile, since unsolved problems motivate scientists to generate
and pursue new ideas. Viewing science from the perspective of problems, oﬀers the most promising way to
understand its progress and how scientists can contribute to this progress (Giunti, 1988:439).
Scientiﬁc problems are essentially problems in the sphere of existing ideas (Popper, 1992:8-9). When
human ideas are incomplete or conﬂict with each other, they create doubts that unsettle our set of beliefs,
which is similar to the view that pragmatists such as Dewey and Peirce held about problems. The word
problem is derived from the Greek word problema, associated with some kind of impediment (Hattiangadi,
1978:353). The unsolved problems of a theory cast doubt on the ideas of that theory, and so may impede
further theoretical advances. These unsolved problems often attract the attention of some theorists and
motivate them to generate new ideas that can remove the doubts that impede theoretical progress.
Progress in the theory of monetary policy was (at the time of Kydland and Prescott’s seminal article)
driven by a number of critical problems, including the problem of whether rules or discretion was the best
foundation for monetary policy. The theoretical analysis of the competing views were inconclusive (Argy,
1988:155) thereby hindering further theoretical progress, until Kydland and Prescott (1977) reframed the
problem as that of time inconsistency and changed the nature of the debate (Schaling, 1995:58). With
2the problem reframed, progress in the theory of monetary policy accelerated as the new problem suggested
original directions for theoretical and empirical research that led to innovative solutions to the problem.
3 Problems as sets of inconsistent assumptions
Theories are solutions to problems, as well as attempts to capture the complexity of reality in the simplest
possible form. To reduce this complexity to a theory, scientists make assumptions. Knowledge as represented
by scientiﬁc theories is therefore limited and tenuous, since no theory can capture the complexity of reality
perfectly. Also in monetary policy theory, where Kydland and Prescott made their contribution, limited
knowledge is a key stumbling block (McCallum, 1997:8-10).
Beliefs, in the form of assumptions, are needed to ﬁll the gaps in our understanding of reality due to
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge. As new problems are discovered in existing theories, and as reality
itself changes, diﬀerent or additional assumptions are needed. As a result scientiﬁc knowledge and ideas
changes over time and inconsistencies may gradually appear in the assumptions. This is compounded when
reality changes in response to economic theorists’ models and discoveries, for example when previously
known empirical regularities disappear as they are exploited by policymakers (see for example the literature
on performativity e.g. MacKenzie, 2006). It may also happen that the logical consequences of known
assumptions conﬂict with beliefs or logical consequences not yet made explicit, so that inconsistencies may
exist without immediately being apparent. Yet another source of inconsistent assumptions is when rival
theories with competing views and diﬀerent sets of assumptions are developed to address an existing problem.
For example, those who argue for discretion will argue from a set of assumptions that are inconsistent with
some of the assumptions of those who argue for a policy rule. If there were no inconsistent assumptions, a
discipline would have no conceptual problems, and there would be no incentive to pursue theoretical progress.
Logical consistency within the vast number of assumptions and derived statements in economic theory is
not likely to be achieved. Cherniak (1984:755-756) demonstrates that it would take an ideal computer twenty
billion years to determine the logical consistency of only 138 well-deﬁned statements. Consider how long
it took the economics profession to even see the logical inconsistency between just four known assumptions
from which Arrow’s Theorem was derived, and Arrow’s two initially unsuccessful attempts in 1951 and 1962
to correctly prove the existence of the inconsistency (Denzau & North, 1994:26). The literature on the
time inconsistency problem alone consists of more than 138 assumptions and statements, and many of them
are not well-deﬁned. It is inevitable, therefore, that numerous logical inconsistencies exist in the ﬁeld of
monetary policy theory.
Competing views, whose assumptions are inconsistent with each other, were responsible for the rules
versus discretion debate in monetary policy theory. This debate originated in the 19th century with the
Currency and Banking Schools. The Currency School favoured rules and their ideas were further developed
by many theorists, including proponents of rational expectations theory. The Banking School favoured
discretion, whose views later found support in optimal control theory. Kydland and Prescott (1977:474)
pointed out that the role of expectations in agents’ decision-making was logically "inconsistent with the
assumptions of optimal control theory", thus maintaining the problem.
When there are logical inconsistencies in a set of beliefs, a contradiction will follow. Any statement can
be derived from inconsistent assumptions, including statements that contradict each other, also known as
the principle of ex falso quodlibet in classical logic (Tomassi, 1999:120). This makes any set of inconsistent
assumptions valueless since all courses of action can be derived from such a set, and will give no guidance
on how to achieve certain ends. For example, a set of inconsistent assumptions about monetary policy will
generate the logically contradictory conclusion that the central bank should use discretionary policy and a
policy rule. At best, this leads to indecisiveness and movement between extremes; at worst it leads to actions
that aggravate the problem. In other words, inconsistent beliefs impede the achievement of goals, and thus
constitute a problem.1 A contradiction therefore places a constraint on possible solution activity.
1This applies to theorists engaged in scientiﬁc activity, which is the focus of this paper. It may not be always be the case in
the case of exchange activity on markets. In markets inconsistent beliefs about the future (e.g. so-called bulls and bears) are
3Imperfect theories, with inconsistent assumptions, inevitably generate further problems or gaps that
need to be addressed by additional or diﬀerent assumptions and the development of new theories. The
time inconsistency problem, for example, created new unsolved problems of institutional design, timing and
the credibility-ﬂexibility trade-oﬀ. These problems motivated theorists such as Barro and Gordon (1983),
Rogoﬀ (1985), Walsh (1995) and Haubrich and Ritter (2000) to generate new ideas to solve them. As old
problems spawn new problems, the resulting theoretical development may follow a path that is reminiscent
of “technological trajectories” (Dosi, 1988:1128).
In short, unsolved scientiﬁc problems are not only impediments to the advancement of theory, but also
create incentives for theorists to pursue theoretical advances. One can describe such problems as contradic-
tions or conﬂicts generated by logically inconsistent beliefs (Hattiangadi, 1978:357). The conﬂicting nature
of economic problems is also evident from the fact that economic problems are often represented as trade-oﬀs
(conﬂicts between means or ends as is evident from Phelps’ work), but also as dilemmas (much appearing
in the theory of economic policy), paradoxes (as Kydland and Prescott did) or knowledge gaps created by
inconsistencies (which led Stiglitz to his theoretical innovations).
The inconsistencies that cause problems mean that such problems can be logically structured as contra-
dictions in the form of a destructive dilemma. The generic representation is as follows:
G ⊃ R · R ⊃ A
G ⊃ R” · R” ⊃∼A
∴ ∼ Rg ∼ R”
∴ ∼ G
In the above generic representation of a problem, G,R,R”,Aand ∼ A are statements. G is a common
objective, R and R” are diﬀerent requirements that need to be satisﬁed to achieve the objective, and A
and ∼ A (not-A) are apparently conﬂicting actions to satisfy the requirements. The conditional statement
G ⊃ R” can now be translated as: if goal G is to be achieved then requirement R” must be satisﬁed. All
four conditionals will only be plausible if they are supported by certain assumptions.
A and ∼ A are believed to be logical opposites, so both cannot simultaneously be true, in other words
∼ (A∧∼A). In the generic representation, if we derive both A and its negation ∼ A, then either R or
R” must be false. Since R and R” are both derived from G, and one of them is false, G cannot be true.
The existence of a contradiction therefore causes the truth of all statements to be in doubt, and thus the
underlying assumptions are of little use in the pursuit of truth. When doubt enters, a problem appears,
calling for an inquiry into our beliefs (Backhouse, 1998:193-194).
However, several philosophers have pointed out that not all scientiﬁc problems can be described as
contradictions arising from inconsistent beliefs (Giunti, 1988:421-439; Nickles, 1981:94; Wettersten, 2002:487-
536). This description fails in the case of empirical problems (problems that can be solved by collecting
more data or explaining the data) but is better suited to describing conceptual problems (problems due to
inconsistencies and incompleteness in our theories, classiﬁcations and concepts).
An understanding of conceptual problems must precede an understanding of empirical problems. Em-
pirical problems are derived from conceptual problems, but conceptual problems do not always follow from
empirical problems (Nickles, 1981:93). For example, the early empirical problem of measuring central bank
independence (such as Alesina, 1989) emerged from the conceptual problem of time inconsistency. Science
aims to give us a coherent and complete picture of the world at a conceptual level, so the main task of scien-
tists is to solve conceptual problems. Since this paper aims to develop a method for stimulating theoretical
innovation in economic science, it will explore only conceptual problems. The next two sections will explain
how inconsistent assumptions structure economic problems.
necessary if any exchange is to take place.
44 Logical representation of the fundamental problem
All scientiﬁc ﬁelds emerge from a fundamental conceptual problem or question, which can be represented
as a contradiction. As scientists attempt to address the fundamental problem, new problems appear in a
tree-like hierarchical structure (Hattiangadi, 1979:53-61). As mentioned above, this process is similar to
Dosi’s (1988) notion of technological paradigms and trajectories — with the fundamental problem playing
the role of the paradigm and the trajectory being the result of new problems arising from the solution of
old problems. The closer a scientiﬁc problem is to the fundamental problem in its ﬁe l d ,t h em o r ec r i t i c a l
it is to the progress of that ﬁeld. The solutions to critical problems contribute more to the solution of the
fundamental problem.
From one perspective, the fundamental problem in economic science centres on how to utilise scarce
means, with alternative uses, to achieve speciﬁed ends (Robbins, 1952:16). From attempts to solve this
fundamental problem, critical problems such as imperfect competition, asymmetric information, institutions
and macroeconomic stabilisation arose. Kydland and Prescott’s (1977, 1982) work directly addressed the
critical problem of macroeconomic stabilisation.
Using the fundamental contradiction in economics (derived from the scarcity problem) as an example,
one can also show an alternative graphic representation. Such a representation makes the logical structure
clearer. This visual perspective of the logical structure of problems is derived from Goldratt (1994:22) and in
Figure 1 its representation is applied to one of many possible versions of the fundamental economic problem.
Figure 1 implies that there is a common objective in economic science which is to ﬁnd ways to increase
human welfare (G). On the one hand, if this objective is to be achieved, then it is argued that deliberate
steps need to be taken to improve the state of the economy as a whole (R) which implies intervention of
some kind of authority (positive action). On the other hand, it may be argued that to increase welfare it is
necessary that agents be allowed to exercise choices that are in their own interest (R”), which necessitates
that the market works without interference (negative action). The result is a problem, because interference
in the market (A) is in direct conﬂict with letting the market work freely (∼ A)2.
Statements R,R”,Aand ∼ A are a logical consequence of certain assumptions. The graphic representa-
tion makes it easier to locate these assumptions. The assumptions are implicit in the connectives labelled
It oI V ,a n di nc o n n e c t i v eΦ which indicates a logical contradiction. The assumptions cause the problem
because they either lead to conﬂicting statements (assumptions in connectives I, II, III or IV) or because they
lead to the belief that a contradiction exists (assumptions in connective Φ). The assumptions can be made
explicit by asking those who agree with the conditional connectives (I to IV) to explain why one particular
statement follows from another statement, or asking those who believe in connective Φ why they believe A
and ∼ A are not compatible. To explain and justify the conditional statements of connectives I to IV, one
would need to make further statements which will lead one to ﬁnd the beliefs underlying each connective.
One may also ask why it follows that interference is in conﬂict with the free working of the market, and so
ﬁnd the beliefs that maintain connective Φ (e.g. beliefs relating to the nature of freedom, interference and
institutions). Following such a process, it is possible to ﬁnd the assumptions that provide structure to the
problem, as demonstrated in the next section.
Theorists from one competing view will look at one side of such a contradiction and not agree with
the conclusions. For example, some theorists will challenge the statement that interference is necessary to
improve the state of the total economy, and proceed to give several reasons for their view. When they do so,
they are identifying and challenging the assumptions that underlie the logic of logical connective II, thereby
demonstrating that beliefs were what cause this problem and maintains it. A diﬀerent set of beliefs may
resolve this particular problem.
The assumptions cause the problem either because they lead to conﬂicting statements (connectives I, II,
III or IV) or because they lead to the belief that a contradiction exists (connective Φ). Beliefs can lead to a
2One of the critical problems that emerge from this dualistic representation is the role of institutions. Theories of institutions
show that the opposing sides are not necessarily in conﬂict and so oﬀer one way of addressing the fundamental problem. By
nurturing and establishing appropriate market-supporting institutions, government can shape the state of the economy (R)
while at the same time letting the market work more freely (∼A) (see for example Rodrik, 2000:5).
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II one may ﬁnd an assumption that only an overarching authority can possess suﬃcient knowledge of the
economy to direct agents to make globally optimal choices. However, under connective IV one may ﬁnd
an assumption that the market mechanism enables individual agents to bring about outcomes as if they
possessed the collective knowledge of all agents. The two underlying assumptions are inconsistent, and thus
lead to contradictory conclusions.
5 Logical representation of the rules vs discretion problem
Kydland and Prescott reframed the problem of monetary policy in such a way that it changed the nature
of the rules-discretion debate and made the case for policy rules stronger. Kydland and Prescott (1977:474)
noted that Friedman’s (1948) statement of the monetary policy problem did not succeed in settling the
debate, since he accepted the problem as framed by the competing view. Friedman did this by taking on the
key assumption of the competing view (advocates of discretion) that economic planning is a “game against
nature”. Friedman argued that without a rule, policymakers will be tempted into excess activism due to
ignorance about the state of the economy and the timing and magnitude of the eﬀects of policy (states of
nature).
Kydland and Prescott formulated their problem as a paradox, integrating the theoretical developments
a tt h et i m ei nt h eﬁelds of game theory and rational expectations as well as the Lucas critique. They showed
that the paradox arises because economic planning is in fact not only a "game against nature" but also
"a game against rational economic agents" (Kydland and Prescott, 1977:473). To see how Kydland and
Prescott’s statement of the problem was diﬀerent from previous statements, it will help to consider the
possible logical structure of the monetary policy problem as they framed it.
In Table 1 the problem is structured as a set of logical statements, rather than graphically (as in Figure
1). The belief operator B is added here to indicate that not all theorists will agree with both sides of the
contradiction. To simplify, x and y are two groups of theorists with competing views and inconsistent beliefs.
Group x argues for discretion and group y argues for rules. Bx, then stands for "x believes that..." The
role that belief plays in causing the problem is thereby recognised, acknowledging the possibility that the
statements may be open to challenge. Since conﬂicting beliefs may exist within the mind of one theorist, it
is likely to be the case that x ∩ y 6= ∅.
On the one hand, x believes that if the social objective function is to be maximised, it is necessary to select
the best policies given the current state of the economy. Selecting such policies would imply the continuous
use of discretionary policy. This side of the paradox assumes that economic planning inﬂuences only states
of nature. On the other hand, y believes that to maximise the social objective function, it is necessary select
the best decision given how agents form expectations and make choices. To do this, policymakers need to
follow a policy rule. This side of the paradox assumes that economic planning inﬂuences the states of agents.
A case for both discretionary policy and a policy rule can be argued given the objective function, but both
x and y believe that discretionary policy is in contradiction to a policy rule.
What made Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) work so useful, is the clarity with which they made the
assumptions of both sides explicit, then showed how those assumptions structured the problem, and ﬁnally
argued from those assumptions. They brought to the surface at least twenty assumptions underlying the
four conditional connectives of the problem as it is expressed in Table 1. Table 2 identiﬁes only some of
the assumptions they identiﬁed that support each of the connectives. Later reviews of the rules-discretion
debate, such as Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and critics, such as Blinder (1997) and Haubrich and Ritter
(2000), made further assumptions explicit.
Connective I contains assumptions that mainly support the argument that states of nature aﬀect the social
objective function, while connective III contains assumptions that support the conclusion that the states of
agents aﬀect the social objective function. The assumptions underlying connective II mainly relate to notions
that policy actions are necessary and suﬃcient to optimise economic performance. Underlying connective IV
are assumptions relating to the eﬀect of policy on agents and how agents respond to policy. The opposing
6horns of the destructive dilemma seem logical in isolation given their assumptions, but when juxtaposed
the two horns appear contradictory. The logical contradiction is generated because the assumptions of
connectives I and II are inconsistent with those of connectives III and IV.
Now we can see why Friedman’s use of ignorance of the timing and magnitude of policy eﬀects as an
argument for a policy rule could not settle the rules-discretion debate. It led to a diﬀerent statement R" and
ad i ﬀerent set of assumptions under connectives II and IV. In such a case, statement R" will be diﬀerent
from what it was in Table 1, and probably read ’Select best decision given the expected future state of the
economy’ which assumes that policy is a game against nature.
Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) article would not have been as signiﬁcant if it had simply reframed the
problem and made its assumptions explicit. The reframed problem with its explicit assumptions enabled
Kydland and Prescott, and those who followed, to reason to new ideas that revolutionised monetary policy.
6 Conceptual problems as sources of theoretical progress
Most economic theories are deduced from a set of beliefs or assumptions, using the tools of classical logic
and or the mathematics derived from it. Theoretical progress occurs when existing beliefs are replaced by
new beliefs that allow innovative ideas to emerge that lie outside the accepted body of knowledge. Since
deduction from an unchanging set of assumptions will always lead to the same ideas, innovation cannot
result from pure deductive thinking (involving classical logic). For a solution to be innovative, it must not be
deducible from the current state of art (Redelinghuys, 2000:271) or from a succession of previous decision-
making events (Rizzello, 1999:132). Schumpeter (1954:41) suggested that the same is true of theoretical
innov ationineconomics"...ofwhichthesourcesisnottobefoundinthefacts,methods,andresultsofthe
pre-existing state of the science."
Innovative solutions or theories are derived from new or diﬀerent assumptions, which are discovered by
challenging known logical relationships and so lead to a more consistent set of assumptions. New assumptions,
as Einstein explained, emerge from "leaps of conjecture" (involving abductive reasoning) which are only later
related to existing theories and real world phenomena through logic (Holton, 1979:319). This explains why
many innovations appear logical in hindsight.
If conceptual problems exist as a result of existing assumptions being inconsistent, then one method for
theoretical progress is to challenge the assumptions that maintain the problem with a view to generating
one or more new assumptions. From these new assumptions, innovative ideas can be derived. If these
innovative ideas are successful, they will result in dissolving the contradiction by synthesising the conﬂicting
sides (Redelinghuys, 2000:272; Savransky, 2000:60-62; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002:995). The dissolution of a
contradiction may also reveal itself as a dilemma resolved, a paradox explained, a trade-oﬀ eliminated or a
debate between competing views settled (Hattiangadi, 1979:67-68).
The structure of a problem as represented in Table 1, suggests three strategies of abductive reasoning
that may be used to synthesise conﬂicting sides (see Table 3). One strategy involves ﬁnding assumptions
that directly reconcile the opposing actions (i.e. assumptions that reconcile A and ∼ A). The other two
strategies do so indirectly by ﬁnding assumptions that allow a speciﬁca c t i o n( A or ∼ A) to satisfy its
opposing requirement.
Abductive reasoning can be described as the creative process of generating new hypotheses (or assump-
tions in this case) to explain anomalies or facts that are surprising given existing beliefs. Abductive reasoning,
as a method for generating new ideas, has been proven and substantially improved by researchers in com-
putational philosophy and artiﬁcial intelligence since it was proposed by the pragmatist philosopher Charles
Peirce (Paavola, 2006). It possesses a clear logical structure and can thus provide a systematic strategy for
reasoning to new ideas.
When looking for new hypotheses or assumptions, theorists can actively provoke their emergence by
deliberately proposing phenomena that are surprising given the current theory. Each surprising phenomena
can be derived from the structure of the problem and provides the basis for a diﬀerent abductive reasoning
strategy. The three phenomena in Table 3 would have been regarded as surprising given the theory at the
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imagination. However, if any of the surprising phenomena could be made plausible, then the contradiction
would be resolved. So each surprising phenomena served to provoke open-minded theorists into actively
generating assumptions or hypotheses that would have made any one of the surprising phenomena plausible
given the state of the theory at the time.
Finding assumptions that made the three surprising phenomena plausible, required abductive reasoning.
The arguments listed in Table 3 could not be deduced given the known logical relationships around the
time of Kydland and Prescott’s article, so pure deduction at that time would not have led to the innovation
that occurred later. However, once the synthetic assumptions were found, it was a matter of mathematical
deduction from these assumptions to develop theories that could be integrated into the existing body of
knowledge.
Kydland and Prescott’s work constitutes successful theoretical innovation, since they brought to the
surface the inconsistent assumptions underlying the rules-discretion debate, challenged those assumptions
and thus triggered innovative theoretical work along the lines of the three strategies in Table 3. Kydland
and Prescott (1977) themselves employed the R ⊃∼A strategy. They showed that discretion is suboptimal
relative to the policy rule. The policy rule (∼ A) is therefore the best decision given any state of the economy
(R) in the long run.
Innovation in monetary policy theory did not stop with the research of Kydland and Prescott. They
set the scene for a burst of innovation. By framing the problem of monetary policy, they created new
contradictions that directed further innovative empirical and theoretical research. It is through this later
innovation in the ﬁeld of economic policy that the real impact of their research was experienced.
Time inconsistency highlighted a new contradiction (in the form of the trade-oﬀ between credibility and
ﬂexibility) in monetary policy theory, and attempts to address this trade-oﬀ spurred much of the innovation
that followed. The basic idea behind the trade-oﬀ is that the central bank can increase its ﬂexibility to
stimulate employment (e.g. by sending ambiguous signals) at the cost of losing credibility. It can only raise
its credibility by sacriﬁcing ﬂexibility.
The credibility-ﬂexibility trade-oﬀ raised the issue of the role of the central bank. Central bank indepen-
dence gained importance as a way to resolve the time inconsistency problem and so to improve the trade-oﬀ
between credibility and ﬂexibility. Rogoﬀ (1985:1169) employed the strategy R” ⊃ A when he argued that
the problem can be resolved if a central bank chair, with a greater inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o nt h a ns o c i e t ya sa
whole, is appointed. In this way, optimal discretionary policy (R”) may be followed, while the best decisions
are made given decision-making by agents in society (A). In an attempt to address the problem raised by
Rogoﬀ’s proposal, Lohmann (1992:273) suggested a "nonlinear" policy rule and a sharing of the costs of
discretionary policy. Also in the spirit of the R” ⊃ A strategy was the idea of optimal contracts for central
banks as ﬁrst suggested by Walsh (1995:163-164), where the remuneration the government awards to the
central bank declines in proportion to the inﬂation rate. A vast amount of empirical literature on central
bank independence also emerged soon thereafter from the theoretical work (see for example Alesina and
Summers, 1993).
Incentive contracts naturally led to the idea of inﬂation targeting, which has been adopted by over twenty
countries since 1989. Inﬂation targeting has also created its own contradictions and thus spawned extensive
empirical and theoretical research (see for example Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen, 2001; Ball and
Sheridan, 2003).
Some theorists employed the A∧∼A strategy. Haubrich and Ritter (2000:782) identiﬁed one of the
assumptions that maintained the conviction that a policy rule and discretionary policy cannot be used
together. The assumption is that choosing a policy rule is irrevocable, or that the choice between A and ∼ A
is an all or nothing choice. They pointed out that choosing discretion today does not prevent a policymaker
from choosing commitment tomorrow. Waiting to commit has value and this led them to reframe the problem
as an intertemporal choice problem and to use a new approach (from the perspective of options) to analyse
the problem. Blinder (1997:12) also used the A∧∼A strategy when he stated that in reality the choice is
not only between ﬁne-tuning (discretion) and no tuning (rule), but that the alternative of "coarse tuning"
exists. As is the case with conceptual problems, he also pointed out that vague meanings (in this case the
8meaning of "no ﬁne-tuning") maintain the problem.
7C o n c l u s i o n
While most gifted economic theorsists are adept at using the tools of formal analysis (such as classical
logic and mathematics), it is not in the formal analysis that one ﬁnds the reason for the quality of their
contributions. Instead, such theorists are able to identify the critical problems that make a contribution
towards resolving the fundamental problem of economic science.
While necessary, formal analysis is not suﬃcient to someone hoping to contribute to theoretical progress
in economics. Like Kydland and Prescott, such work is delivered when one takes time to frame the critical
problems in a way that assumptions, and especially the inconsistent assumptions, are made explicit.
Once the assumptions are brought to the surface, resourcefulness and imaginative thinking are required
to question the assumptions that appeared beyond doubt before, and to generate new synthetic assumptions
that reconcile the contradiction inherent in the critical problem. Formal analytical tools are then used to
make the ideas appear logical in hindsight by connecting the innovation to the existing body of knowledge.
The eﬀort is successful when the contradiction or trade-oﬀ is resolved, and when the new assumptions direct
further innovative theoretical and empirical research by others. Trade-oﬀs that once seemed rigid constraints
on economic activity may suddenly dissolve as new knowledge is created as a result.
Logical contradictions and inconsistent assumptions are often seen as the enemies of of theoretical
progress, and the tools of classical logic and mathematics are designed to eliminate them. Yet, if hu-
man assumptions were not inconsistent, there would be no problems, and no need for scientists. Inconsistent
assumptions are the friends of scientiﬁc innovation, and scientists who are adept at using such assumptions
to their advantage, are likely to deliver more innovative work.
Unfortunately, no formal analytical tools exist at this stage that can direct theorists in this kind of
creative eﬀort, although this paper suggested a starting point for the development of such tools. Further
research in the application of abductive reasoning and non-classical logic to economics can build on this paper
to develop a set of tools to extend the innovative capability of economists and the economics profession.
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11Table 1: Framing the inconsistency problem in monetary policy 
 
Connective I  Bx(G⊃R)   
Connective II  Bx(R⊃A)   
Connective III  By(G⊃R")   
Connective IV  By(R"⊃~A)   
Connective Φ  Bx[~(A∧~A)] 
By[~(A∧~A)] 
 
Let G = 'Maximise social objective function'; R = 'Select best decision given current 
state of economy'; A = 'Discretionary policy'; R" = 'Select best decision given 
decision-making by agents'; ~A = 'Policy rule' 
 
Table 2: Assumptions that structure the time inconsistency problem in Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) 
 
Connective I  "…agreed-upon, fixed social objective function…" (p.473), 
"…current outcomes and the movement of the system's state depend 
only upon… the current state…" (p.474), "…expectations depend in 
some mechanical ad hoc way upon [the] past…" (p.478) 
Connective II  "…current outcomes and the movement of the system's state depend 
only upon current and past policy decisions…" (p.474), "…effect of 
π2 [future policy] upon x1 [agents' current decisions] is zero…" 
(p.476), "…decision rules of agents as given… (p.481) 
Connective III  "…agreed-upon, fixed social objective function…" which is a 
function of policies and agents' decisions (p.475), "Changes in the 
social objective function… have an immediate impact upon agents' 
expectations… and… current decisions" (p.474) 
Connective IV  "…current decisions of economic agents depend in part upon their 
expectations of future policy actions" (p.474), "…expectations are 
rational…" (p.478), "…policy rule [affects] the optimal decision 
rules of the economic agents" (p.474)  
 
Table 3: Three abductive reasoning strategies to find synthetic assumptions 
 
Strategy  Explanation in terms of time-inconsistency paradox 
 
R⊃~A 
How can the best decision given 
current state of economy be 
selected by following a policy 
rule? (new connective) 
 
R"⊃A 
How can the best decision given 
the decision-making by agents be 
selected, by following 




How can both discretionary policy 
and a policy rule be followed? 













shape the state of 
the total economy 
(R)  I 
Let the market 
work freely 
(~A)  IV 
Interfere in the 
working of the 
market (A) 
Let agents make 
choices in their 
own interest (R") 
II 
Φ 
~(A∧~A) 
III 
G⊃R 
G⊃R" 
R⊃A 
R"⊃~A 
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